This Is the End

RICK BOOKSTABER

Markets, Risk and Human Interaction

April 17, 2010

The Accidental Egalitarian: Technology and the Distribution of Income

April 17, 2010
This represents my personal opinion, not the views of the SEC or its staff.
This month’s Institutional Investor AR magazine came out with its list of the highest compensated hedge fund managers. I already have expressed my doubts about the accuracy of their approach, though you can adjust the numbers by an order of magnitude and it is still off the charts. But for all that is being written about hedge fund managers and their poorer cousins, the banking elite, about the expanding income gap, and about the new frugality and the changing American dream, the differences between the very rich and the rest of us are shrinking.

Up until the last part of the 1900’s, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s observation that “the very rich are different from you and me” certainly was true. And it wasn’t only, as Hemmingway later quipped, that they had more money. It was how that money transformed their lives and how it variegated society. But no longer.

This might sound like a preposterous statement. But when we use the dollar differences in income to measure the gap, we are measuring it the wrong way. What matters is the practical impact, how the differences in income carry through to make a difference in how we live day by day, even hour by hour. A head to head income comparison does not measure that; it misses the effect of work habits and lifestyle, and, most critically, the effect of technological progress on filling in the income gap. Don’t stop with dollars earned. Ask how people earning those dollars spend their time.

There is one thing everyone has in common, no matter what their income: They have twenty-four hours in a day. So differences in income can only be expressed by what they do in those twenty-four hours, and how they do it. Let’s observe snippets of a typical day in the life of Billionaire Malcolm III and compare it to high-earning Professional Bob and think about how much the thousand-fold income differential between the two leads to differences in what they are doing and how they do it; how many minutes of the day their activities differ.

A starting assumption is that both Bob and Malcolm III work hard. You probably do, too. You wouldn’t run off to spend the rest of your life on a beach in the south of France, really, even if you could. If the lifestyle in the get-rich-quick infomercials of sitting with unbounded leisure time is your end game, then you are on a different fork of the road than where this discussion is heading.

Now let’s look at the time that Malcolm III and Bob spend on their workday activities and see what that extra billion does:

Sleep Time. Seven to eight hours of the day, they are both asleep. They have beds, black-out shades and a sound machine. So right off the bat around a third of the day is the same.

In the morning. They shower, shave and get dressed. We are past the age of butlers drawing baths and helping lay out clothes, so there is no differences in this realm. And it’s dress-down day at work, so they both have on jeans and a polo shirt. They grab a coffee and bagel for breakfast. For Malcolm III it is ready and waiting in the kitchen thanks to his housekeeper. Bob stops for his on the way to work – his live-in girlfriend has already left and forgot to turn on the coffee machine. Still no difference worth thinking about.

To the office. Malcolm III has a driver to take him to the office, Bob takes a taxi. Or drives himself. Bob’s car is an Acura TL Type S. Malcolm has, among other cars, a Porche 911 Turbo. On the open road, it can leave Bob’s Acura in the dust. Too bad they live in New York and not Frankfurt.

At work. They both are at their desks dealing with e-mails and then plan to spend some time polishing a presentation. Malcolm III has a team of administrative assistants outside his office to take care of his mundane tasks like travel and insurance. Bob has one secretary, and she does the same for him. Malcolm’s office is spacious with an antechamber, a sitting area and a lot of doo-dads and pictures with celebrities on his bookshelves. But look at what Malcolm and Bob are actually doing. They are engaged in the same sort of work with the same sort of equipment, and for all practical purposes they are occupying a forty square-foot world. For lunch they both eat a sandwich at their desk.

In terms of their workday,
I am ignoring some characteristics that we associate with the Malcolm’s of the world, things that really don’t have to do with Malcolm’s wealth per se. For example, he oversees many people and he can order those people around autocratically. His underlings have to listen to his philosophical views about building an open work culture, which make their way into company-wide e-mails and a spiral bound volume that he hands out around bonus time. These are coincident to being a billionaire, but being a billionaire is not required to have these trappings. There are generals, CEOs and government bureau chiefs in the same situation. And army lieutenants and factory floor supervisors.

Evening Activities. Unwinding after work, they both happen to end up at The Modern, next to the MOMA, to meet business associates. Then off they go, home to have dinner, spend some time on the web, and then watch a movie. Malcolm III is doing this in a house that is five times the size of Bob's. Malcolm III’s house is a sprawling estate with a living room, dining room, library, sitting room, billiard room, sunroom, solarium, four fireplaces, a guest cottage and a pool. It has a large entry with a spiral staircase, marble floor, and mahogany woodwork. And so on.

But it doesn’t matter – he is in a 200 square foot room to the side of the kitchen sitting on his couch twelve feet from his big-screen surround sound set, beer in hand, just like Bob is.

Of course, there are some big differences, differences that will be manifest maybe twenty or thirty hours of any given month. Bob takes commercial flights, upgraded to business class, while Malcolm flies in his private jet. Malcolm shells out to be on various charity boards and spends time at gala events. In terms of pastimes, if Bob’s passion is breeding racehorses, the America’s Cup or collecting big name contemporary art, too bad.


Depending on their personalities and philosophical bent, even these differences might not matter all that much. For example, if Malcolm III is environmentally conscious, he doesn’t take a private jet. He drives a Prius rather than a Porche, and even takes the subway to work. If he is introverted or nerdish, then rather than hobnobbing at the black-tie events, his idea of a good social gathering is a small dinner with his friend who writes for Wired and the one who is researching nano biotechnology. And he will not care much about items of conspicuous consumption, because he doesn’t care about being conspicuous.
Many in the technology sector have promulgated this ethos; it is an egalitarian side effect of the boom in technology.

The point of this is to illustrate that the day-to-day impact of wealth is lower today. A century or so ago, in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s era, there was little time during the waking hours when the activities of the very rich did not differ from those a rung or two down. Even if we look back a few decades we see that gaps have disappeared. Back then, only the wealthy could have a screening room in their home; drivers would stick fake antennas on their cars to impress passersby. Now Joe and Malcolm have the same computers, high-definition TVs, Blackberries and i-Phones, game systems, Kindles, cameras – and these are the things that occupy most of their non-sleeping, non-showering lives. In fact, in terms of hour-by-hour activities, my kids are more Malcolm-like in many respects than I am. They have iPhones, Tivos, large screen monitors, Playstation 3 game systems, and subscriptions to netFliks. I don’t.

This analysis is interesting as far as it goes. Indeed, that it only goes so far is what makes it interesting. What I did for Malcolm III and Bob could also be done for the professional versus the skilled salaried worker, the skilled salaried worker versus the unskilled hourly worker, and so on down to those in extreme poverty working for a dollar a day. But as you continue down the income ladder from the Professional Bobs of the world, another dimension beyond how people are spending their hours becomes of increasing importance.

Drop one more order of magnitude in income and compare Journalist Jamie to Malcolm III and Bob. The hour-by-hour comparisons will still work; Jamie will not differ that much from Bob in what he is doing with his time; certainly the differences will be far lower now than they would have been even a few decades ago. Even though Jamie does not have a secretary to help with his daily tasks, he can quickly dispatch most everything on line – except for the crazy time spent on hold with insurance and the cable company.

But Jamie has a lot to worry about that Malcolm and Bob do not. Malcolm will never have to worry about money, Bob has a large nest egg to protect him against a downturn in his work, but for Jamie, one false step, and he has no way to pay for his house, no health insurance, uncertain prospects that extend out to the future opportunities for his children.

The reduction in the practical implications of income differences at the higher end of the income scale has created a plateau where there used to be a hill. But that plateau has a stark cliff at the edge. Jamie might be on the plateau shared by Malcolm and Bob, doing much the same with his time as they are, but he is closer to that cliff. If Jamie loses his job he is no longer looking down at the abyss, he is over the edge.

The flatter the plateau and the more sudden and deep the abyss, the stronger the argument for social programs, because the costs of redistribution for those on the plateau are lower in practical terms, and the fall from the plateau is more crushing. In the limit, if the plateau is completely flat, so that there is no practical difference in income within the upper range, people should be indifferent about moving along that plateau toward the cliff if at the same time the cliff can be securely fenced off.

Put in other terms, more akin to the way we think about financial trade-offs, there is both the expected value of one’s income (measured by what it does for you in practical terms) and the uncertainty surrounding it. As the means from one person to the next converge, the uncertainty takes on increasing significance. As the “how you spend your time” differential shrinks, a reduction in uncertainty through an improvement in the safety net becomes of increasing importance. Indeed, in the limit, if everyone is typically spending their time doing the same things, reducing this uncertainty is all that matters.

April 4, 2010

The Municipal Market

April 04, 2010
This represents my personal opinion, not the views of the SEC or its staff.

My first blog post was in June, 2007. It was titled “What sorts of crises am I worried about now”. My answer was housing and credit. With the benefit of hindsight, this might be considered a no-brainer, although at the time it was not so clear where things would go.

Now as the dust settles from the crisis that emerged in 2008, we can start to think about what might come next. And yes, the crisis really is settling down, despite the alarmists who, thinking we were in a 1930’s style depression, pushed the panic button and stuffed their mattresses (or portfolios) with cash. For whatever reason, be it astute government intervention or the natural healing process, we are looking back at something along the lines of a bad, credit-driven recession.

I don’t think we will see a big crisis emerging for some time in banks, hedge funds or derivatives, mostly because, like with a knockout punch, the risks that matter don’t come from where you are looking. Unless the current push for legislation is a failure, which, of course, still remains to be seen, we will have steely eyes hovering over these sources of crisis. It will be awhile before the guards start dozing off at their posts.

So, where to look next. To see other potential sources of crisis, let’s first recount the lessons learned from this crisis:
  1. Problems occur when things get leveraged and complex (and thus opaque).
  2. If the problems occur in a very big market, especially in a very big market like housing that is tied to the credit markets, things can go systemic.
  3. The notion that you can diversify by holding a geographically broad-based portfolio, (“there has never been a nation-wide housing recession”), works fine – until it doesn’t.
  4. A portfolio that is apparently hedged can blow apart. So we have to look at the gross value of positions, even if they are thought to be hedged.
  5. Don’t bet on ratings, because rating agencies are conflicted and might not be all too dependable at their job.
  6. Defaults are never easy to manage, but it gets worse when there are a lot of them happening at the same time. It is harder to manage the mess, and there is less of a stigma in defaulting. And it is all the worse when, as is the case in the housing markets, those defaulting are not businessmen. As an added complication, with housing the revenue that we thought was there really wasn’t. Income that was supposed to be there to finance the mortgages – even when that income was fairly stated – became committed to other areas (like second mortgages). .
Well, guess where we have a market that is (1) leveraged and opaque, that is (2) very big and tied to the credit markets; and is (3) viewed by investors as being diversifiable by holding a geographically broad-based portfolio; with (4) huge portfolios where assets and liabilities are apparently matched; and with (5) questionable analysis by rating agencies; and where (6) there are many entities, entities that may not approach default with business-like dispatch, and that have already mortgaged sources of revenue that are thought to support their liabilities?

Answer: The municipal market.

Leverage and Opacity. Leverage in the municipal market comes from making future obligations to employees in order to pay them less now. This is borrowing in the form of high pension benefits and post-retirement health care, but borrowing nonetheless. Put another way, in taking lower pay today, the employees have lent money to the municipality, with that money to be repaid via their retirement benefits. The opaqueness comes from the methods of reporting. For example, municipalities are not held to the same standards as corporations in their disclosure.

Size and potential systemic effects. That this is a big market in the credit space goes without saying.

Diversification. Geographic diversification would give a lot more comfort for municipals if it hadn’t just failed for the housing market. Think of why housing breached the regional barriers. It was because similar methods of leveraging were being employed through the country. So the question to ask is: Are there common sorts of strategies being applied in municipalities across the nation?

Gross versus net exposure. The leverage for municipals is not easy to see. It might appear to be lower than it really is because many, including rating agencies, look at the unfunded portion of these liabilities. They ignore the fact that these promised payments are covered using risky portfolios. And not just risky -- the portfolio might apply hefty (a.k.a. unrealistic) actuarial assumptions of asset growth.

Rating agencies. In terms of the work of the rating agencies, here are two questions to ask. First, list the last time they did an on-site exam of the municipalities they are rating. Second, are they looking at the potential mismatch between assets and liabilities, or simply at the net – the under funded portion of the portfolio.

Defaults. Municipalities are not quite as numerous as homeowners, but there certainly are a lot of them. And they have the same issues as homeowners. Granted, they will not pour cement down the toilet before walking away. But they have a potentially equally irrational group – the local taxpayers – to deal with.

Oh, and just as homeowners took their income and locked it up via secondary loans, much of the tax base for municipalities is already mortgaged, through the sale of tax-related revenues streams like tolls and parking fees. Indeed, although general obligation bonds are considered the cream of the crop, they might just as well be regarded as the residual claim after anything with solid fee streams has been sold off.

Once a few municipalities default, there is a risk of a widespread cascade in defaults because the opprobrium will be lessened, all the more so if the defaults are spurred along by a taxpayer revolt – democracy at work.

I appreciate comments, but will not be able to respond to them. Also, because this is a personal blog unrelated to my work, I will not be posting comments that do not respect that separation.

March 8, 2010

The Gold Bubble

March 08, 2010
This represents my personal opinion, not the views of the SEC or its staff.

I am not going to spend time here talking about how the price of gold is off-the-wall, that it is not just a bubble in the making, but a bubble waiting to burst. I don’t want to waste your time on that point.We all know it is a bubble.


George Soros has said “The ultimate asset bubble is gold”. Many of the top asset managers, such as Tudor and Paulson, are piling on; Paul Tudor Jones recently said gold “has its time and place, and now is that time.” The banks are echoing this view with their research. Goldman has a research piece that looks for gold to approach $1,400 in the next year. The more ebullient Charles Morris of HSBC has said, “I absolutely believe it’s heading into a bubble, but that’s why you buy it. ” He, along with a number of other professional and otherwise rational managers, looks for gold to move as high as $5,000 an ounce.


More interesting than this almost universal agreement is what that agreement tells us about the dynamics of the market.

The Naked Bubble

Usually the markets have the courtesy of giving cover for bubbles. We adorn the bubbles with some justification. Even if a guy is just after sex, he at least has the decency to act like there is some substance behind his interest. For the Internet bubble, it was that fundamental analysis based on the brick and mortar world did not bear relevance in the New Paradigm. For the Nikkei bubble, it was that the crazy P/E ratios were not considering one subtlety or another in the Japanese accounting system.

But with gold, no one seems even to care about giving a justification, other than “gold has been a store of value throughout 5,000 years of monetary history”. Which is fine as far as it goes, but that doesn’t say anything about what the price of that store of value should be.

Pump and Dump

Given that “hedge fund” and “highly secretive” are usually said in the same breath, don’t you get suspicious when so many of the top managers are so vocally out there about their gold investments? And when their positions are structured in a way that make them open to view? Paulson and Soros have huge positions in gold ETFs. We know that, because if you buy ETFs, they show up in your 13-F filing. Granted, with an equity investment you can’t help putting that information out into the market, but with an asset there are plenty of ways to take the position without signaling it.


That they are taking a highly visible route to their positions suggests the game that is being played is one of leading the herd. The 13-F reports positions with a big lag, so no one will notice if they quietly slip out the side door while the party is still hopping. And how about when the view is backed up by none other than Goldman Sachs? Will they let everyone know when they think it has gone too far before they get out. Or before they go short? Maybe they already have.

Herds, crowds, mobs, and the Top Ten

And yet, we follow the herd, as we have countless times in the past. Herding is a timeless and universal market behavior, but one that seems less than rational. It is broader than markets; think of the Top Ten phenomenon. We feel better if a lot of other people think that our favorite artist or actor is The Best. We like a song better if we know a lot of other people are liking it as well. Thus our love affair with lists. Magazines featuring the Ten Sexiest, the Five Best, the 100 Whatever are all best sellers, even if the list is the product of a story meeting between an editor and five reporters.


Herding can be explained as an artifact of what was rational behavior in earlier times, when we were running around as hunter gatherers. Back then, mob and herding behavior made sense. Mob behavior if attacking a competitive group or killing a large animal; herding behavior if protecting against predators or uprooting to a new location. Whatever it was that got started, you could be pretty sure there was safety in having a crowd on hand to finish it.

The very notion of mobs and herds evokes a certain spontaneity.
But with the gold bubble, we are moving on to a concept of herding by appointment. Everyone seems to be happy in agreeing that this is a bubble, and we are all going to participate in this bubble in a rational, genteel way. We have all decided that this is going to be a number one hit, a Top Ten. Though we might want to ask who is leading this herd, because my bet is they will be stepping aside and cheering us over the cliff.

January 18, 2010

Breaking the Banks

January 18, 2010
The following expresses my personal views, not those of the SEC or its staff.

A few months ago I wrote a post entitled “Why do bankers make so much money?” A corollary question is, “Why do the largest banks make so much more than other banks?”

Addressing this question can help us solve the problem the largest banks pose for systemic risk, and open a channel for demands to curb their outsized profits. Profits that, by the way, are not exactly coming from producing real goods like steel or flat screen TVs. Goldman Sachs might stand foremost in Matt Taibbi’s view as a “great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money”, but all of the largest banks are increasingly seen as machines of wealth transfer, devising ways of pulling money from your pocket into theirs.

The largest banks are different from the rest, and different in ways that make them seem to be bad citizens. Compare them to the banks that are down the line in size, say regional banks, by any of these standards:
  • Amount of risk taking
  • Supplying and pushing of derivatives and other “innovative products”
  • Complexity and opaqueness of operation
  • Incentive structure and level of compensation
  • Ability to call on government support (too-big-to-fail coupled with political weight)
It is not the case that the largest banks are the same as other banks, just bigger. The regional banks are not baby JP Morgans or Goldman Sachs. What sort of trading desks do the regional banks have? How many product specialists/salesmen/modelers designing, pumping out and trading innovative products? What type of proprietary trading desks do they have that piggyback on the bank capital, customer desk trading flow and back-up from the Fed? How many of them are paying out over fifty percent of earnings in compensation? How many have a bee-line to the Fed and Treasury when things get rough?
In the movie Sabrina the title character said, “More isn’t always better... sometimes it’s just more”. But sometimes more is more than just more.The largest banks do things the smaller banks cannot do. They behave differently. They are a separate species, qualitatively different in ways that make them problematic. In fact they aren’t even banks. They are no more like Zion’s National Bank than they are like Fox Pitt, NASDAQ, Tudor Capital or Vanguard.

Another way the largest banks are different is that they have something close to monopoly power. You might be wondering how I can assert this when we all know that there are at least six large banks. (If you want to call it oligopoly power instead, that is fine).

Well, first of all, they are not open to outside competition because there are huge barriers to entry. Second, there are limits to the supply that any one bank can provide, limits to production, so to speak, because as big as these banks are, they cannot operate efficiently if they get much bigger. And third, they promote a noncompetitive industrial organization. They do that by, among other things, creating informational asymmetries. The innovative products they promote -- both derivatives and consumer products -- give them an informational edge over their customers. The trading operations they run do the same.

So if we want to curb the risk taking, too-big-to-fail conflicts, opacity, and the creation of informational asymmetries and complexity, we need to move them down to the scope and scale of the smaller banks. We need to break them up.

If the large banks are broken up into smaller banks, the risk taking, incentive distortions, lack of transparency and too-big-to-fail mentality will drop, and drop more than proportionately. If you buy the argument that the banks can exert something like monopoly power – and with the count of large banks down from a year ago, whatever monopoly power they could exert then, it has got to be worse now – then breaking up the banks will eliminate that power. And it will reduce the barriers to entry that stifle competition.

We did something along these lines before: the Glass-Steagall Act, a.k.a. the Banking Act of 1933. But reinstating Glass-Steagall is not enough, because we will still have a small set of large banks on the one hand, and a small set of large investment banks on the other, with both groups raining down negative externalities. In addition to again separating commercial banking from trading and proprietary risk taking we need to reduce the size of the largest banks and investment banks.

January 2, 2010

Controlled-Burn Inflation

January 02, 2010
The following expresses my personal views, not those of the SEC or its staff.

Suppose all the Good Guys (Joe Consumer and Homeowner) are loaded with debt, and suppose that this debt is payable to the Bad Guys (Rich People and Foreigners).
What can you do about it? Oh, and also suppose that the debt is mostly in nominal terms. Answer: You inflate.

We cringe when inflation is mentioned. Maybe it is from the horror stories of hyperinflation; maybe it is from memories of the inflationary episode of the mid-1970s. (Remember Ford’s WIN buttons)? But I am not talking about hyperinflation, or even inflation in the double digits. Rather, a controlled burn inflation, something that is, say, in the six or seven percent range. Something that will drop the debt burden by twenty or thirty percent after a few years.

On the positive side, controlled-burn inflation will drop the real obligations we will “pass on to our children” – put that phrase into Google and see how many hits you get – for our $8 trillion of public debt. It will reduce the real effect of our nearly $1 trillion to ChinaChina being recently highlighted by Paul Krugman as a Big Problem of 2010. Not to mention the nearly equal amount we have with Japan, which Krugman does not see being as much of a problem. It will drop the real debt obligation for mortgage borrowers in terms of their principal, and, for those with fixed rate mortgages, drop the real cost of servicing their debt as well. Anyone with adjustable rate mortgages or short-term revolving debt will be running in place in terms of their debt servicing. But the real value of their principal obligation will drop for them as well.

The negative is the stickiness of wages versus prices. For those who remember the 1970’s, it seemed like wage levels were always one step behind in ratcheting up to meet the higher prices. And there were costs in making the price adjustment, both in terms of processing and informational lags. But we are in a different world today, and I wonder if the frictions of a “helicopter drop” would be anywhere near as significant. In our electronic age, prices can be adjusted with far less cost, information on prices is quickly and cheaply accessible. And I believe wages can similarly be adjusted for less cost; there are fewer institutional and processing constraints to keep wages sticky – although this is a proposition that has not had to be broadly tested because inflation has been a non-issue for a generation.

To do inflation right, you have to be a little sneaky. Especially if you don’t want your creditors feeling totally screwed and have them walk away the next time you need to borrow. Don’t announce it as a policy. Have it just happen. In fact, have it happen in spite of all of your best efforts to reign it in. So you need a controlled burn that looks like it is spontaneous. Who knows, maybe this idea actually is making the rounds.

December 5, 2009

The Strategy of Conflict

December 05, 2009
To: Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas Prime Minister
Cc: Khaled Mashal, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau
Subject: Will you ever get Shalit off your hands?

I know you are frustrated with how slowly things are going with the Shalit prisoner swap negotiations. You must feel relieved that it is finally just around the corner. Well, it isn't. You are going to be waiting for a long time yet to come. Do you really think Israel will trade hundreds of convicted murderers for one soldier? Have you ever thought there might be something more going on?

You are being played. One tip-off is Israel’s bare-knuckled bargaining posture, which basically is, “Please, please give him back. We will do whatever you want.”

Doesn't this seem odd to you? I mean, put yourself in their shoes. If that sort of deal really goes through, what do you tell the next victims of violence perpetrated by those released in the swap? What do you tell the parents of Israeli soldiers killed in the process of capturing the terrorists who are released, not to mention the relatives of those who were killed in the terrorist attacks? And what about its effect on the incentives (a big topic of discussion in the U.S. right now, though in a slightly different context) for future acts of kidnapping.

I don't know if it translates, but in the U.S. we have a saying: If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.

Here is what is really going on. Israel is having a lot of fun at your expense. They can use the hostage situation as a backdrop to lay siege to Gaza, make incursions with all kinds of cool military hardware, imprison various Hamas leaders as a tit for tat. They can hold off peace talks while expanding settlements. And meanwhile what can you do? Take all of this while sitting through endless negotiations.

This is why Israel is acting like the return of Shalit is the most important thing since 1948. Putting so much focus on him provides Israel a justification for all of this. It is like, well, people spending generations in refugee camps to provide a pretext for terrorism. If the Israelis had said something along the lines of, “Crap, you got one of our guys. Who do you want in exchange,” it would be hard to bring it to the scale of three years of harsh, but you have to admit, from Israel's perspective sort of appealing, measures.

Anyway, I am sure the big question, now that you see what is going on, is how you get yourself out of this mess without becoming a laughingstock. One way is to reduce the number of people you demand in exchange. But you can't do that; it would be politically disastrous. And in any case, if you do go down that path you will discover the negotiations will continue to lurch from one snag to another even when it gets whittled down to a one for one exchange. Maybe you can let him escape. Or ask the Israelis to mount a daring raid, with plenty of bystanders killed in the process – they're not going to do that, but you can – so that more attention is put on their apparent overreaction than your military failure. (You already know how well that works).

But it won't be that easy. You aren't going to be able to get rid of Shalit unless you are willing to give them something big in return.

There was a general expectation you would have figured all of this out about two years ago. By this point everyone is tired of waiting. Any gag can only go on for so long. Of course, Israel cannot be the one to let you in on it, so I am the guy who has ended up with that job.

Now that I've let the cat out of the bag, I am going back to writing about finance.

November 8, 2009

I am going to be working at the SEC

November 08, 2009
I will be working in the SEC's new division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation as Senior Policy Adviser to the Director. Here is a brief article and the SEC announcement. We are facing a critical time for defining the future of the financial system; an opportunity for financial reform that comes only once in a generation (if that), and I am excited to be part of this.

I will still be able to write posts from time to time, but obviously with limits on topics and with appropriate disclaimers. How much free time I have to do so, though, remains to be seen.

I won't be able to publish comments for this post related to the SEC.



November 4, 2009

Does Financial Innovation promote Economic Growth?

November 04, 2009
I participated in an Oxford-style debate at The Economist’s Buttonwood Gathering a couple of weeks ago. The proposition for the debate was Financial Innovation Boosts Economic Growth.
On the pro side of the proposition were Myron Scholes, the chairman of Platinum Grove and Robert Reynolds, the CEO of Putnam, and on the con side were Jeremy Grantham, the CEO of GMO and me. This was the first time I had participated in a formal debate, as I suspect it was for the others. When we came out onto the stage, I overheard one person in the audience say, with a British accent, “Well, they obviously have never been in an Oxford debate before.” I don’t know what we did wrong, but it looks like we even messed up our entrance.
The entire debate is available on the Economist site (scroll to the video "Debate on Financial Innovation") and here. It includes five-minute opening remarks by each participant – first Robert for the pro, then me for the con, then Myron and finally Jeremy. This is followed by questions from the moderator and audience and then closing one-minute Clarence Darrow-moment summations. The debate is pretty interesting, but for those who do not want to spend the time watching it, here are the main points I made.
I elected to restrict my discussion of financial innovation and economic growth in two respects.
First, I focused only on the so-called innovative products. I grant that there are some innovations in the financial markets that have been beneficial; Robert Reynolds gave a summary of many of these. I take as a given that electronic clearing, the adoption of telecommunications, the development of futures, forwards and mutual funds have all had a positive impact.
So what do I mean by innovative products? Well, I could just say you know them when you see them. But when I think about innovative products, I think about them in a three dimensional space. I look at where the product fits in the dimension of simple to complex, standard to customized, and transparent to opaque. The things I term innovative products congregate in the {complex, customized, opaque} region.
Second, I focus on the impact of financial innovation over the past ten or fifteen years. I am looking to the past rather than forecasting the future for two reasons. One is that I do not have a crystal ball, so I cannot project what innovations will occur in the future. Another is that if the future ends up looking like the past, then at least the past can provide a guide. Behavior being what it is, absent regulation to bridle our actions, this is a reasonable assumption to make.
So, defining innovative products in this way and looking over the past ten or fifteen years, let’s look at the ways financial innovation might promote economic growth.
Do innovative products promote growth by increasing market efficiency?
If we were in an Arrow-Debreu world, the answer would be yes, since these products will help span that space of the states of nature. But the incentives behind innovation move in the other direction. The objective in the design and marketing of innovative products is not market efficiency, but profitability for the banks. And market efficiency is the bane of profitability. The last thing a bank wants is a competitive, efficient market, because then it would not be able to extract economic rents. So the incentives are to create innovative products that reduce market efficiency, not enhance it.
How is this done? Well, I can quickly think of two ways. First, by creating informational asymmetries, by having products that are difficult for the users to understand and price. And, second, by designing innovative products, which, due to their non-standard nature, allow the banks to extract higher transaction costs.
Do innovative products promote growth by allowing us to manage risk better?
Hardly. They create risk, or, if you don’t want to go that far, they hide risks. They put risks off balance sheet, obfuscate them through complex schemes, create non-linearities and correlations that only become evident in times of large market changes. They also push more risk into the tails, so that in the day-to-day world things look more stable, but in an extreme event the losses are accentuated.
Earlier in the conference, Larry Summers gave an address where he remarked that since the early 1980s we have had a major financial crisis roughly every three years. Whatever financial engineering and the innovations it creates is doing for the markets, it is not tempering risk.
Do financial innovations help meet investors’ needs?
Unfortunately, the answer is yes. Well, not investor needs, but investor wants. They allow investors to lever when they aren’t supposed to lever, take exposure in markets where they are not supposed to take exposure, avoid taxes, take on side bets in markets where they have no economic interest. I go through some of the uses of derivatives for gaming and gambling in my Senate testimony from June.
Do innovative products promote capitalism?
The answer to this is yes and no. We get capitalism when things are going well, and socialism when things are going poorly. I went through this in a recent post.
Innovative products are used to create return distributions that give a high likelihood of having positive returns at the expense of having a higher risk of catastrophic returns. Strategies that lead to a ‘make a little, make a little, make a little, …, lose a lot’ pattern of returns. If things go well for a while, the ‘lose a lot’ not yet being realized, the strategy gets levered up to become ‘make a lot, make a lot, make a lot,…, lose more than everything’, and viola, at some point the taxpayer is left holding the bag.
If we were to look at the sorts of strategies employed by large investment firms and banks, my bet is we would see a bias toward short volatility, short gamma, short credit and short liquidity. All facilitated with innovative products – you can’t really do the first two without derivatives – and all leading to these sorts of return characteristics.

This was a debate, so we all took the polemic positions. I am not so extreme as to hold that all innovative products, even those that do fit in the {complex, customized, opaque} corner, are devoid of value. But just because we are able to take some cash flow and turn it into a financial instrument doesn’t mean we should. Here are three questions we can ask to determine if a new, innovative product makes sense:
  1. Is there a standard, simple instrument that could do the job – either one that already exists or one that can be created.
  2. Is the primary purpose of the new instrument to meet economic objectives (i.e. helping to get capital to the producers or helping producers layoff risks) or to meet non-economic objectives (i.e. gaming the system, making side-bets on the market).
  3. Does the instrument create negative externalities; on the margin does it increase the risk of market crisis, does it make the market more levered, complex and opaque?

October 23, 2009

Why Do Bankers Make So Much Money?

October 23, 2009
A tenet of economics is that in competitive markets there are no economic rents. That is, people get fairly paid for their efforts, their capital input, and for bearing risk. They are not paid any more than is necessary as an incentive for production. In trying to understand the reason for the huge pay scale within the finance industry, we can either try to justify the pay level as being a fair one in terms of the competitive market place, or ask in what ways the financial industry deviates from the competitive economic model in order to allow economic rents.
Do the banks operate in a competitive market?
No one expects competitive levels of compensation when there are deviations from a competitive market. In what ways might the banks – and here I mean the largest banks and those banks that morphed over the past year from being investment banks – fall away from the model of pure competition?
One way is through creating inefficiencies to keep competitive forces at bay. Banks can do this, for example, by constructing informational asymmetries between themselves and their clients. This gets into those pages of small print that you see in various investment and loan contracts. What we might call gotcha clauses and what the banks call revenue enhancers. And it also gets into the use of complex derivatives and other “innovative products” that are hard for the clients to understand, much less price.
Another way is to misprice risk and push it into other parts of the economy. The fair economic payoff increases with the amount of risk taken. If a bank takes on more risk it should get a higher expected payoff. If the bank can get paid as if it is taking on risk while actually pushing the risk onto someone else, then it will start to pull in economic rents. The use of innovative products comes up again in this context. They provide a vehicle for the banks to push risk to others at a less than fair price. Or, they can push the risk onto the taxpayers by hiding the risk and then invoking the too-big-to-fail protections when it comes to be realized. The current “heads I win, tails you lose” debate centers precisely on this point.
A third, and most obvious reason banks might not be economically competitive entities is the organization of the industry. There are barriers to entry. No one can just decide to set up a major bank. And there are constraint in the amount of business any one bank can do. As we have seen with Citigroup, there finally are diseconomies of scale – after a point the communication and management issues make the bank less efficient and more prone to crisis. If there is fixed supply, then the banks can push up the price of their services. The crisis over this past year has made matters worse. If you are one of those still standing, you are a beneficiary of that crisis, which has choked off the supply even further.
Are the workers getting paid fairly for their efforts?
An alternative to the idea that the industry is not competitive is that the industry really is competitive and those who are getting these outsized paychecks are being fairly compensated for their efforts. This comes back to the term we hear bandied about in conversations on banker compensation: talent.
There is no denying there are many smart people in the banking industry. (Though I think from a social welfare standpoint, we might have done better if some of those physicist and mathematicians that populate the ranks of the banks had found greener pastures in, say, the biological sciences). But I don’t buy the notion that there are so many who have the level of talent that justifies tens and even hundreds of million in compensation. I think this level of compensation, and the notion of talent behind it, is the result of the inherent uncertainty in the financial enterprise, one that makes it very difficult to assess talent. Indeed, I think the invocations of talent for money producers in finance are akin to those that, in times past, were set aside for the mystical powers of saints and witches.
Far more than other fields of endeavor, it is difficult in finance to tell if someone is good or lucky. A top trader or hedge fund manager might have a Sharpe Ratio of 1.0 or 2.0. But that Sharpe Ratio is nothing less that a statement that if you get a hundred people trading, a few will do well just by luck. (And it doesn’t matter if that Sharpe Ratio occurred over the period of one year or twenty – though the greater sample size helps, it is still the same point in terms of statistical inference, so a long track record does not get you away from this problem).
How does this tie in with saints and witches? People want certainty, and if they can’t get the certainty they want from the empirical, they fall back on superstition and witchcraft, or at least they used to way back when. In some medieval village, a priest prayed and a supplicant was healed. The odds that the supplicant would have healed spontaneously was whatever it was, but there was more of a sense of certainty to feel that it was the manifestation of healing power.
There were false saints and true saints. The difference between them became manifest over time by how frequently the prayers were answered with affirmative results. Not that any saint had to bat a thousand. Sometimes there were understandable, exogenous circumstances that inhibited the saint’s healing talents from being operative, most commonly a lack of righteousness on the part of the supplicant, occasionally an inevitability, a higher power that overshadowed that of the saint. Maybe the will of God, maybe an unknown, evil curse.
I hope the analogy is apparent. And there is a related one, an analogy to Pascal's Wager. The bank should wager that the talent of its star employee exists, because it has much to gain over time if it does, while if it does not exist, the bank will lose little in expected terms. And in a competitive world, it is even worse if they incorrectly let the talent go for lack of proper compensation, because then some competitor will pick it up.